This PR's author says there on October 1st: "Got an email from Oracle asking me to NOT proceed with a PR until receiving approval." and then on October 28th: "It's taken over by Oracle. Nothing required from us."
The proper way to deal with a security bug in any Oracle software is to zero day it.
They are the biggest asshole of a company when it comes to anything, but especially security issues. They are one of the least friendly companies to security researchers and are likely to attack you with lawyers.
Fuck Oracle. We should be putting them out of business.
Yesterday on a post I was stating that Responsible Disclosure has been the worst thing for computing ever. It has lulled humanity into the idea that computers are safe and we've built just massive amounts of digital infrastructure under that delusion.
If every bug was a zero day then we'd have never hooked things like water grids and electrical grids to networks. Grocery stores and bloodbanks would have never put freezers on the internet. Along with a million other huge security risks, too many to be named here.
That's just not true. People don't hook up freezers to the internet because they think it's safe, they do it because it's cheap and convenient, and saves having to send someone out to manually check them every X hours. The free market doesn't reward more than legally minimum safety requirements.
Your view can be harmonized with your parent comment's view.
Capitalism rewards all sorts of safety requirements, if they become visible to a balance sheet within a reasonable period of time. Just look at marine insurance in the middle east right now.
The status quo is that IoT freezers are massively inconvenient every decade or so. Businesses can live out an entire lifecycle in this period of time, without the risk ever hitting their balance sheet.
pixl97 is saying: what if we made the risk far more common, so that its effect shows up on a balance sheet within 6-12 months?
No, not really. This baby is rotten and infected with a corporate culture that looks to extract as much money out of you via any way possible, especially lawfare. If you're standing up with Oracle I need to point at the sign again.
The sign: "Do not fall into the trap of anthropomorphizing Larry Ellison. Think of Larry Ellison the way you think of a lawn mower. You don't anthropomorphize your lawn mower. Your lawn mower just mows the lawn. You stick your hand in there, it'll chop it off, the end. You don't think "oh the lawn hates me!" the lawn mower doesn't give a shit about you. Your lawn mower can't hate you. Don't anthropomorphize the lawn mower. Don't fall into that trap about Oracle."
I really struggle to understand why anyone would trust a company that started as a CIA domestic surveillance project. The government's tentacles are deeply embedded in this company, which is partly why they feel so emboldened to engage in lawfare against anyone who might challenge them.
I don't think that's a reasonable implication at all.
There are lots of bugs in lots of software, and lots of them get ignored when reported.
I personally aware of multiple security vulnerabilities in major pieces of software that everyone has heard of, which I very quickly and easily stumbled on while working on this software as an AWS engineer several years ago. I had never used an LLM of any kind at the time.
I presented my findings both internally and externally, and the reactions ranged from shrugs to delays to hostility towards me for "getting distracted" or "being overly negative."
Those bugs that I discovered still exist, last time I checked.
Why it was closed, surely, was because the only reaction to the PR was a bot saying it will automatically close the PR soon because of inactivity?
I know I have opened a lot of PRs where the only result is I get bot spam in my email and no project reaction, so I close the PR to stop the bot spam; if nobody from Oracle has reacted in 2 months it seems unlikely anyone will.
Nowadays I’ve stopped opening “cold-call” PRs like this. I find a way to chat with a maintainer first and anchor what I want to do (“I hit this bug, would you take a PR to fix it? I was thinking it could be solved by x, would that work?”
Though in the age of LLM, I really wonder what the benefit of asking for permission to make a PR is? It's not like you are wasting much effort, if they don't want it. And if they do want it, the PR is right there, instead of waiting for another round-trip.
There may still be an incline to give the PR’s fix strategy a “fair chance” and feel obliged to comb through it, which if the change is somewhat intricate can present a bigger hump to get through.
Yea I've let claude make a couple PRs when it's clearly a bug in the repo, if the maintainer wants to take a stand against AI PRs so be it, my local copy has the fix.
I'd be surprised if that's what happened. The instant I see "corrupting the heap" I assume it's a serious vulnerability unless proven otherwise. AI is taking it to another level, but the days of dismissing memory corruption as unexploitable died years before.
From califio: "I focused the audit on the JIT compiler, intrinsics, widely accessible APIs, and cryptography. Well, more precisely, I told Codex to look at those areas like any serious security researcher in 2026."
Maybe simply a coincidence, but I would put my bets that the first person with the PR was also using Codex, and the model was exposed to the details of the bug.
> From califio: "I focused the audit on the JIT compiler, intrinsics, widely accessible APIs, and cryptography. Well, more precisely, I told Codex to look at those areas like any serious security researcher in 2026."
I have no idea why people keep talking like this. Probably because sadly most engineers lack the ego to back themselves up. Imagine if someone said this in 2015:
"I worked on the physics engine, tests, via widely accessible libraries. Well, more precisely, I told my compiler to read the source code and compile it like any serious software engineer in 2026."
Quit saying Codex/Claude/an LLM did something. They didn't. You did.
"I worked on the physics engine, tests, via widely accessible libraries." is a nonsensical sentence as written, but a colleague who told me they had done this would be telling me a vastly different thing to if they had told me they had compiled the source code to a physics engine.
There is a massive difference between prompting "security audit this codebase, make no mistakes", performing an in-depth agent or LLM-assisted focused search for security relevant code, or otherwise manually reviewing code as we did in the pre-LLM era. It behooves us to be honest about our own personal contribution to our output - both towards others and to ourselves.
I don't disagree with you necessarily, and I do think it a good practice to disclose how much of a contribution was llm generated, but regarding the difference an individual makes, I see a huge gap between different colleagues in how well they are able to use llms and the quality of the results they are able to produce with them, so I am increasingly inclined to view them as something closer to a compiler or SMT solver than a contributor in of themselves.
I am also finding this disparity.
I hand off the agent skills I use daily, to produce the results I want in the way I want them, to some people and I still get poor results, and others I get good results. There's something about a combination of tools, prompting and FTGs about the outcomes that combine into these different results. I should imagine at some point that will disappear?
> Quit saying Codex/Claude/an LLM did something. They didn't. You did.
I think there's a vast difference between giving source code to a compiler (even a superoptimizing compiler) and giving a prompt to a language model. This distinction absolutely deserves to be called out and not swept under the rug. It doesn't make you any less responsible for what you submit, but it's courteous to your reviewers to be transparent.
A frontier AI is nothing like a compiler. The litmus test is how much expertise was required to get it to find the results. If a basic prompt brings up an industry-shaking vulnerability of this caliber, then the human was at best a janitor.
Is it really fair to say that I did something when my contribution was typing straightforward English prose for thirty seconds and then letting it run?
Your hypothetical makes the opposite point from what you intend. If someone in 2015 said that they worked on a physics engine, and all they did was run the compiler on existing code, we'd laugh them out of the room. Pointing an existing computer program at existing work doesn't count as doing very much.
There were no public comments precisely because it was immediately identified as a potential security risk! The JDK is so critical and sensitive (probably the most important open source project after Linux) that we have policies that are more carefully considered than your normal open source project. We can allow no public comments and no public merges of code on anything that could be a security risk before the security research team studies it.
I work on the JDK, and while I have no involvement with this issue, knowing how we work, what has likely happened is quite the opposite. Bugs don't slip through our triage, and every bug that leads to a VM crash, especially in the compiler backend, is flagged for security review by the security research team; once that happens, no public communication is done. I don't know this is what happened here, but it is the most likely thing to have happened.
We're not talking any large open source project here. We're talking about a project that, like Linux, runs much of the world's software infrastructure, and even bugs that could potentially be vulnerabilities need to be handled with great care.
Because it runs so much of the world's most important software, the JDK is heavily watched, and removing a PR would only draw attention to it.
Also, it's not really a leaked 0-day because there's ways to go from a bug to an exploit (even going from Calif's detailed public report to an exploit is not trivial, because exploits depend on the particular application; there has been no disclosed exploit that requires only the JDK).
They closed themselves immediately after the stale bot pinged to say it was going to be closed automatically. If you're not that investigated in a PR for a niche corruption bug, you open it and nobody responds for two months, when you get notified about it it's pretty reasonable to just close and move on. Perfectly normal OSS contributor behaviour imo (especially in this new world where every project is drowning under AI contributions, and struggling to stay responsive).
> you open it and nobody responds for two months, when you get notified about it it's pretty reasonable to just close and move on.
Why invest more time to close it? The automation will do it for you.
In this case, there's evidence from a linked issue that Oracle was in communication with the author outside the PR. When you get a ping, and you know it's being worked on outside the PR, it does make sense to close it, cause you know it's being resolved elsewhere.
Why should someone discovering a bug in an enormously complex piece of software have any responsibility for assessing the security implications of that bug?
If the maintainers wanted to make it private they could have done so.
Given they (those best able to understand the significance of the crash) didn't consider the bug worth fixing, I'm not sure why they'd admonish the submitter. Or why submitters in the future should act more carefully.
The takeaway from this is not "the submitter was wrong", it's "we need to move off of openjdk yesterday".
Assumes facts not in evidence. We do not know that the maintainers "didn't consider the bug worth fixing". And yes, submitters should "act more carefully" when they know they are reporting a vulnerability.
Even Duke gave up on the current state of software.
Would it be better to have some Oracle gpus running the dukebot? Are the robobun and friends better at real triage/escalation? Could we automate the robobots to register the `java2root.com` domain on its own, release a blog post and post it in twitter/hn upon every successful security issue?
The bot auto-closes issues that have been inactive for 16 weeks. The CVE was published at about 10 weeks in. The auto-close bot was completely irrelevant to this. The issue wasn't that it got auto-closed (it didn't) but that nobody from the project looked at the PR. That's a hard problem to solve, because any big project has a lot of volume and it's easy to miss things. It's unfortunate but a fact of life that you can't just toss up a PR and expect anyone to automatically look at it.
Except that in Base64 it’s not the alternating bit pattern of hex A (binary 0101), which is the property one uses it for in memory, but instead decodes to all-zeros (and is binary 01000001 in ASCII before decoding).
This PR's author says there on October 1st: "Got an email from Oracle asking me to NOT proceed with a PR until receiving approval." and then on October 28th: "It's taken over by Oracle. Nothing required from us."
https://github.com/adoptium/adoptium-support/issues/1480#iss...
edit: also oracle is big enough to have one of every modern gen to test on
They are the biggest asshole of a company when it comes to anything, but especially security issues. They are one of the least friendly companies to security researchers and are likely to attack you with lawyers.
Fuck Oracle. We should be putting them out of business.
If every bug was a zero day then we'd have never hooked things like water grids and electrical grids to networks. Grocery stores and bloodbanks would have never put freezers on the internet. Along with a million other huge security risks, too many to be named here.
The AI age has exposed that stupidity.
Capitalism rewards all sorts of safety requirements, if they become visible to a balance sheet within a reasonable period of time. Just look at marine insurance in the middle east right now.
The status quo is that IoT freezers are massively inconvenient every decade or so. Businesses can live out an entire lifecycle in this period of time, without the risk ever hitting their balance sheet.
pixl97 is saying: what if we made the risk far more common, so that its effect shows up on a balance sheet within 6-12 months?
The sign: "Do not fall into the trap of anthropomorphizing Larry Ellison. Think of Larry Ellison the way you think of a lawn mower. You don't anthropomorphize your lawn mower. Your lawn mower just mows the lawn. You stick your hand in there, it'll chop it off, the end. You don't think "oh the lawn hates me!" the lawn mower doesn't give a shit about you. Your lawn mower can't hate you. Don't anthropomorphize the lawn mower. Don't fall into that trap about Oracle."
There are lots of bugs in lots of software, and lots of them get ignored when reported.
I personally aware of multiple security vulnerabilities in major pieces of software that everyone has heard of, which I very quickly and easily stumbled on while working on this software as an AWS engineer several years ago. I had never used an LLM of any kind at the time.
I presented my findings both internally and externally, and the reactions ranged from shrugs to delays to hostility towards me for "getting distracted" or "being overly negative."
Those bugs that I discovered still exist, last time I checked.
- why was this not a secure vulnerability report, why was it public?
- why was this closed [by the submitter]?
For the second question, I suspect it's because they were told a different fix was coming.
I know I have opened a lot of PRs where the only result is I get bot spam in my email and no project reaction, so I close the PR to stop the bot spam; if nobody from Oracle has reacted in 2 months it seems unlikely anyone will.
Nowadays I’ve stopped opening “cold-call” PRs like this. I find a way to chat with a maintainer first and anchor what I want to do (“I hit this bug, would you take a PR to fix it? I was thinking it could be solved by x, would that work?”
Much much better outcomes that way.
Because it was seen as a crash not an RCE. AI's power has been chaining simple crashes into exploits. But that's not generally going to be true.
Nonetheless, being able to understand the criticality of a finding, and how to exploit it are other skills, that still require supervision.
I often do this when looking for low hanging fruit. A lot of the time you find half-abandoned PRs when the original author ran out of damns to give.
Maybe simply a coincidence, but I would put my bets that the first person with the PR was also using Codex, and the model was exposed to the details of the bug.
I have no idea why people keep talking like this. Probably because sadly most engineers lack the ego to back themselves up. Imagine if someone said this in 2015: "I worked on the physics engine, tests, via widely accessible libraries. Well, more precisely, I told my compiler to read the source code and compile it like any serious software engineer in 2026."
Quit saying Codex/Claude/an LLM did something. They didn't. You did.
There is a massive difference between prompting "security audit this codebase, make no mistakes", performing an in-depth agent or LLM-assisted focused search for security relevant code, or otherwise manually reviewing code as we did in the pre-LLM era. It behooves us to be honest about our own personal contribution to our output - both towards others and to ourselves.
I think there's a vast difference between giving source code to a compiler (even a superoptimizing compiler) and giving a prompt to a language model. This distinction absolutely deserves to be called out and not swept under the rug. It doesn't make you any less responsible for what you submit, but it's courteous to your reviewers to be transparent.
Your hypothetical makes the opposite point from what you intend. If someone in 2015 said that they worked on a physics engine, and all they did was run the compiler on existing code, we'd laugh them out of the room. Pointing an existing computer program at existing work doesn't count as doing very much.
Because when people really spend the effort required to fully review and own the result, somehow they don't have a problem of pointing at models.
https://github.com/adoptium/adoptium-support/issues/1480
It was literal bug with provided fix. All it needed is someone to have a proper look.
But someone clowned a bot under a visionary thought "if nobody looked it must not be important" and here we are
We're not talking any large open source project here. We're talking about a project that, like Linux, runs much of the world's software infrastructure, and even bugs that could potentially be vulnerabilities need to be handled with great care.
Also, it's not really a leaked 0-day because there's ways to go from a bug to an exploit (even going from Calif's detailed public report to an exploit is not trivial, because exploits depend on the particular application; there has been no disclosed exploit that requires only the JDK).
Why invest more time to close it? The automation will do it for you.
In this case, there's evidence from a linked issue that Oracle was in communication with the author outside the PR. When you get a ping, and you know it's being worked on outside the PR, it does make sense to close it, cause you know it's being resolved elsewhere.
Sorry, but why?
Why should someone discovering a bug in an enormously complex piece of software have any responsibility for assessing the security implications of that bug?
If the maintainers wanted to make it private they could have done so.
> The stub stores past the logical output length before returning to Java, corrupting the heap.
That's obviously a security vulnerability. If they didn't understand that, how did they even find it?
> The stub stores past the logical output length before returning to Java, corrupting the heap.
It was obviously a security vulnerability. That the project didn't immediately re-write then close the PR and admonish submitter is astounding.
The takeaway from this is not "the submitter was wrong", it's "we need to move off of openjdk yesterday".
Would it be better to have some Oracle gpus running the dukebot? Are the robobun and friends better at real triage/escalation? Could we automate the robobots to register the `java2root.com` domain on its own, release a blog post and post it in twitter/hn upon every successful security issue?
Except soon you can expect LLM triage to be standard.
We would then find out if enough tokens would be invested in this one to figure out it was important, but any look is better than none.
I actually think the suggestion in the PR should have been auto accepted by an LLM.
You might follow up with a De Bruijn/cyclic pattern and can see the overflow happen by step1 and precisely locate it by what replaces the A's.
https://youtu.be/L2j90atBpRU?is=q6W_1eF4viMoKZEA
Didn't the Alpine Linux bug also use A's for the exploit to login as root?
Although maybe they didn’t even know their LLM was doing this.